RELATING KNOWLEDGE SPECIFICATIONS BY REDUCTION MAPPINGS

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Abstract: Knowledge can be specified at different levels of conceptualisation or abstraction. In this paper, lessons learned on the philosophical foundations of cognitive science are discussed, with a focus on how the relationships of cognitive theories with specific underlying (physical/biological) makeups can be dealt with. It is discussed how these results can be applied to relate different types of knowledge specifications. More specifically, it is shown how different knowledge specifications can be related by means of reduction relations, similar to how specifications of cognitive theories can be related to specifications within physical or biological contexts. By the example of a specific reduction approach, it is shown how the process of reduction can be automated, including mapping of specifications of different types and checking the fulfilment of reduction conditions.

1 INTRODUCTION

Specification languages play a major role in the development of knowledge models, as a means to describe specific functionalities aimed at. Functionalities can be described at different levels of conceptualisation and abstraction, and often different languages are available to specify them, varying from symbolic, logical languages to algorithmic, numerical languages. The question in how far such different types of specifications can be related to each other has not a straightforward general answer yet. Specifications of different types can just be used without explicitly relating them, as part of a heterogeneous specification. In a particular case relationships can be defined of the type that output of one functionality specification is related to input for another specification. From the perspective of knowledge management, however, it may be useful when general methods are available to relate the contents of different specifications as well. The aim of this paper is to explore possibilities for such general methods, inspired by recent work in the philosophical foundations of Cognitive Science.

Within the philosophical literature the position of Cognitive Science has often been debated; e.g., [3, 18, 20]. Recent developments have provided more insight in the specific characteristics of Cognitive Science, and how it relates to other sciences. A main issue that had to be clarified is the role of the specific (physical or biological) makeup of individuals (or species) in Cognitive Science. Cognitive theories have a nontrivial dependence on the context(s) of these specific makeups. Due to this context-dependency, for example, regularities or relationships between cognitive states are not considered genuine universal laws and cannot be directly related to general physical or biological laws, as they simply can be refuted by considering a different makeup. The classical approaches to reduction that provide means to relate properties (or laws) of one level of conceptualization to properties (or laws) of another level (e.g., bridge law reduction [25], functional reduction [20] and interpretation mappings [29]) do not address this context-dependency properly. In this paper a context-dependent refinement of these approaches is proposed that provides a way to clarify in which sense regularities in a cognitive theory relate on the one hand to general physical/biological laws and on the other hand to specific makeups or mechanisms.

In this paper, first the lessons learned about the philosophical foundations of Cognitive Science are briefly summarised in Section 2. Section 3 shows how these findings can be applied to relate different knowledge specifications. This is illustrated for an example of adaptive functionality, for which two different types of knowledge specifications are given: one logical specification (at a higher level of conceptualisation), and one algorithmic, numerical specification (at a lower level). Section 4 describes how different types of reduction relations can be defined to relate the two types of knowledge specification. Furthermore, in Section 5 it is shown in this example how the interpretation mapping approach to reduction can be automated, including checking the fulfilment of reduction conditions. The paper concludes with a discussion in Section 6.

2 SOME OF THE MAIN ISSUES

The status of Cognitive Science has since long been the subject of debate within the philosophical literature; e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20]. Among the issues questioned are the existence and status of higher-level cognitive laws, and the connection of a higher-level specification to reality. For example, it is claimed that Cognitive Science is not an independent science, and cognitive laws as genuine laws do not exist. Furthermore, it is often claimed that higher-level cognitive concepts have no principled, unambiguous relation to reality, and explanations based on them are not genuine (causal) explanations. These claims imply that Cognitive Science is at least not a science comparable to general sciences such as Physics and Chemistry. Similar conclusions are sometimes drawn about other so-called special sciences such as Biology and Social Sciences. Within the philosophical literature on reduction since a long time much effort has been invested to address these criticisms, with partial success; e.g., [25, 18, 19, 20, 5, 6]. In response to the severe criticisms, alternative views have been explored.

In recent years much attention has been paid to explore the possibilities of the notion of *mechanism* within Philosophy of Science, often in relation to Biology, Cognitive Science and Neuroscience; e.g., [7, 8, 12, 13, 23, 1, 2]. Among the claims made is that mechanisms may provide fruitful answers to the types of problems and debates mentioned above, and more specifically concerning explanation, reduction, and situatedness. One of the issues addressed by mechanisms is how a certain (higher-level) capability is realised by organised (lower-level) operations. Usually it is proposed to leave the solutions that were earlier proposed (and criticized) in the literature on reduction behind, and fully commit to an alternative approach based on mechanisms. For example, it is proposed to replace explanations referring to laws by explanations referring to mechanisms. In this paper, it is shown how certain aspects addressed by mechanisms can also be addressed by refinements of approaches to reduction, such as the bridge law approach [25], the functional approach [19, 20], and the interpretation mapping approach [29].

Before going into the details, first some of the central claims from the literature in Philosophy of Mind are illustrated for an example case study:

(a) Cognitive laws are not genuine laws but depend on circumstances, for example, in the form of an organism's makeup.

(b) Cognitive laws can not be related (in a truth-preserving manner) to physical or biological laws

(c) Cognitive concepts and laws cannot be related to reality in a principled manner, but, if at all, in different manners depending on circumstances.

(d) Cognitive explanations are not genuine causal explanations.

A central issue in these claims is the observation that the relationship between a higher-level conceptualisation and reality has a dependency on the context of the physical or biological makeup of individuals and species, and this dependency remains unaddressed and hidden in the classical reduction approaches. Perhaps one of the success factors of the approaches based on mechanisms is that referring to a mechanism can be viewed as a way to make this context-dependency explicit.

To get more insight in the issue, an example case study is used concerning functionality for adaptive behaviour, as occurs, in conditioning processes in the sea hare *Aplysia*. For *Aplysia* underlying neural mechanisms of learning are well understood, based on long term changes in the synapses between neurons; see, for example, [11, 14]. *Aplysia* is able to learn based on the (co)occurrence of certain stimuli; for example; see [11].

The example functionality for adaptive behaviour is described from a global external viewpoint as follows. Before a learning phase (1) a tail shock leads to a response (contraction), but (2) a light touch on its siphon is insufficient to trigger such a response. Suppose a training period with the following protocol is undertaken: in each trial the subject is touched lightly on its siphon and then immediately shocked on its tail. After a number of trials the behaviour has changed: the behaviour also shows a response (contraction) to a siphon touch. From an external viewpoint, the overall behaviour can be summarised by the specification of a relationship between stimuli and (re)actions involving a number of time points:

> If a number of times a siphon touch occurs, immediately followed by a tail shock, and after that a siphon touch occurs, then contraction will take place.

To obtain a higher-level description of the functionality of this adaptive behaviour, a sensitivity state for stimulus-action pairs *s-a* is assumed that can have levels low, medium and high, where high sensitivity entails that stimulus *s* results in action *a*, and lower sensitivities do not entail this response:

> If s-a sensitivity is high and stimulus s occurs, then action a occurs.
> If stimulus stim1 and stimulus stim2 occur and stim1-a sensitivity is high, and stim2-a sensitivity is not high, then stim2-a sensitivity becomes one level higher.

As a next step, it is considered how the mechanism behind this higher-level description works at the biological level for *Aplysia*. Roughly spoken the internal neural mechanism for *Aplysia*'s conditioning can be depicted as in Fig. 1, following [11].



Figure 1: A neural mechanism for adaptive functionality

A tail shock activates a sensory neuron SN1. Activation of this neuron SN1 activates the motoneuron MN via the synapse S1 between the two neurons; activation of MN makes the sea hare move. A siphon touch activates the sensory neuron SN2. Activation of this sensory neuron SN2 normally does not have sufficient impact on MN to activate MN, as the synapse S2 between SN2 and MN is not strong enough. After learning, the synapse S2 has become stronger and activation of SN2 has sufficient impact to activate MN. If SN2 and MN are activated simultaneously, this changes the strength of the synapse S2 between them: the effect is that in this synapse more neurotransmitter is produced whenever SN2 is activated. After a number of times this leads to the situation that synapse S2 is strong enough so that activation of SN2 leads to activation of MN. This description is on the one hand based on the specific makeup of Aplysia's neural system, but on the other hand makes use of general neurological laws. A (simple) neurological theory consisting of the following laws explains the mechanism:

> Activations of neurons propagate through connections via synapses with high strength.
> Simultaneous activation of two connected neurons increases the strength of the synapse connecting them.
> When an external stimulus occurs that is connected to a neuron, then this neuron will be activated.
> When a neuron is activated that is connected to an external action, then this action will occur.

Claims (a) and (b) discussed above are illustrated by the *Aplysia* case as follows. The neurological laws considered are general laws, independent of any specific makeup; they are (assumed to be) valid for any neural system. In contrast, the validity of the higher-level specification not only depends on these laws but also on the makeup of the specific type of neural system; for example, if some of the connections of *Aplysia*'s neural system are absent (or wired differently), then the higher-level specification will not be valid for this organism. This shows that the validity of the higher-level specification depends on the context given by the neural makeup of *Aplysia*. As the neurological laws do not depend on this makeup, the higher-level specification can not be related (in a truth-preserving manner) to the neurological laws. Claim (c) can be illustrated by considering other species than *Aplysia* as well, with different neural makeup, but showing similar conditioning processes. Claim (d) is also supported by these observations, as it is difficult to consider causal relationships between chameleon-like higher-level concepts that, depending on the context, show up in reality in different forms, where virtually any physical or biological concept can become a realisation of such a higher-level concept, as soon as an appropriate context is created around it. A central issue shown in this illustration of the four claims is the notion of makeup, which provides a specific context of realisation of the higher-level specification. Indeed, the classical approaches to reduction ignore this aspect, whereas the approaches based on the notion of mechanism explicitly address it. However, variants of these classical approaches can be defined that also explicitly take into account this aspect of context-dependency, and thus provide support for the claims (a) to (d) instead of ignoring them. This will be addressed in Section 3.

3 CONTEXT-DEPENDENT REDUCTION RELATIONS

Reduction addresses relationships between descriptions of two different levels, usually indicated by a higher-level theory T_2 (e.g., a cognitive theory) and a lower-level or base theory T_1 (e.g., a neurological theory). A specific reduction approach provides a particular *reduction relation*: a way in which each higher-level property or law a (an expression in T_2) can be related to a lower-level property or law b (an expression in T_1), this b is often called a *realiser* for a. Reduction approaches differ in how these relations are defined. Within the traditional philosophical literature on reduction, such as [25, 18, 19, 20], three approaches play a central role. In the classical approach, following Nagel [25] reduction relations are based on (biconditional) bridge principles $a \leftrightarrow b$ that relate the expressions a in the language of a higher-level theory T_2 to expressions b in the language of the lower-level or base theory T_1. In contrast to Nagel's *bridge law reduction*, *functional reduction* (e.g., [20]) is based on functionalisation of a state property a in terms of its causal task C, and relating it to a state property b in T_1 performing this causal task C. From the logical perspective two closely related notions to formalise reduction relations are *(relative) interpretation mappings* (e.g., [29, 28, 15, 21]. These approaches relate the two theories T_2 and T_1 based on a mapping φ relating the expressions a of T_2 to expressions b of T_1, by defining $b = \varphi(a)$. Within philosophical literature, for example, Bickle [4] discusses a variant of the interpretation mapping approach with roots in [16, 9, 10].

For each of the three approaches to reduction as mentioned a context-dependent variant will be defined. As a source of inspiration [18] is used, where it is briefly sketched how a local or structure-restricted form of bridge law reduction can handle multiple realisation within different makeups. In this section it is shown how this idea of context-dependent reduction can be worked out for each of three approaches, thus obtaining variants making the dependency on a specific makeup explicit.

In context-dependent reduction the aim is to identify multiple context-specific sets of realisers. When contexts are defined in a sufficiently fine-grained manner, within one context the set of realisers can be taken to be unique. The contexts can (but do not need to) be chosen in such a manner that all situations in which a specific type of realisation occurs are grouped together and described by this context. E.g., in Cognitive Science such a grouping could be based on species. When within each context one unique set of realisers exists, from an abstract viewpoint contexts can be seen as a form of parameterisation of the different possible sets of realisers.

In context-dependent reduction approaches, a context can be taken a description S (of an organism or system with a certain structure) by a set of statements within the language of the lower-level theory T_1. For a given context S as a parameter, for each expression of T_2 there exists a realiser within the language of T_1. Context-dependent reduction as sketched by Kim ([18], pp. 233-236), assumes that the contexts all are specified within the same base theory T_1. However, if mental state properties (for example, having certain sensory representations) are assumed that can be shared between, for example, biological organisms and robot-like architectures, it may be useful to allow contexts that are described within different base theories. In the multi-theory-based multi-context reduction approach developed below, a collection of lower-level theories $\mathcal{T}_1$ is assumed, and for each theory T in $\mathcal{T}_1$ a set of contexts $\mathcal{C}_T$, such that each organism or system is described by a specific theory T in $\mathcal{T}_1$ together with a specific context or makeup S in $\mathcal{C}_T$; these contexts S are assumed to be descriptions in the language of T and consistent with T. For the case that within one context only one realisation is possible, the theories T in $\mathcal{T}_1$ and contexts S in $\mathcal{C}_T$ can be used to parameterise the different sets of realisers that are possible. Below it is shown how contexts can be incorporated in the three reduction approaches discussed above.

Context-dependent bridge law reduction

For this approach, a unique set of realisers is assumed within each context S for a theory T in $\mathcal{T}_1$; this is expressed by context-dependent biconditional bridge laws. Such context-dependent bridge laws are parameterised by the theory T in $\mathcal{T}_1$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$, and can be specified by

$$a_1 \leftrightarrow b_{1,T,S},\ \ldots,\ a_k \leftrightarrow b_{k,T,S}$$

Here a_i is an expression specified in the language of theory T_2, and b_i is an expression in the language of theory T_1 corresponding to a_i. Given such a parameterised specification, the criterion of context-dependent bridge law reduction for a law $L(a_1, \ldots, a_k)$ of T_2 can be formulated (in two equivalent manners) by:

(i) $T_2 \vdash L(a_1, \ldots, a_k) \quad \Rightarrow$

$\forall T \in \mathcal{T}_1\ \forall S \in \mathcal{C}_T$

$$T \cup S \cup \{a_1 \leftrightarrow b_{1,T,S},\ \ldots,\ a_k \leftrightarrow b_{k,T,S}\} \vdash L(a_1, \ldots, a_k)$$

(ii) $T_2 \vdash L(a_1, \ldots, a_k) \;\Rightarrow$

$\forall T \in \mathcal{T}_I\, \forall S \in \mathcal{C}_T\;\; T \cup S \vdash L(b_{1,T,S}, \ldots, b_{k,T,S})$

Here $T \vdash A$ denotes that A is derivable in T. Note that this notion of context-dependent bridge law reduction implies unique realisers (up to equivalence) per context: from $a \leftrightarrow b_{T,S}$ and $a \leftrightarrow b'_{T,S}$ it follows that $b_{T,S} \leftrightarrow b'_{T,S}$. So the idea is that to obtain context-dependent bridge law reduction in cases of multiple realisation, the contexts are defined with such a fine grain-size that within one context unique realisers exist.

Context-dependent functional reduction

For a given collection of context theories $\mathcal{T}_I$ and sets of contexts $\mathcal{C}_T$, for context-dependent functional reduction a first criterion is that a joint causal role specification $C(P_1, \ldots, P_k)$ can be identified such that it covers all relevant state properties of theory T_2. As an example, consider the case discussed in ([18], pp. 105-107). Here the joint causal role specification C(alert, pain, distress) for three related mental state properties is described by:

> For any x,
> if x suffers tissue damage and is normally alert, x is in pain
> if x is awake, x tends to be normally alert
> if x is in pain, x winces and groans and goes into a state of distress
> if x is not normally alert or is in distress, x tends to make typing errors

By a Ramseification process the following joint causal role specification is obtained. There exist properties P_1, P_2, P_3 such that $C(P_1, P_2, P_3)$ holds, where $C(P_1, P_2, P_3)$ is

> For any x,
> if x suffers tissue damage and has P_1, x has P_2
> if x is awake, x has P_1
> if x has P_2, x winces and groans and has P_3
> if x has not P_1 or has P_3, x tends to make typing errors

The state property 'being in pain' of an organism is formulated in a functional manner as follows:

> There exist properties P_1, P_2, P_3 such that $C(P_1, P_2, P_3)$ holds and the organism has property P_2.

Similarly, '*being alert*' is formulated as:

> There exist properties P_1, P_2, P_3 such that $C(P_1, P_2, P_3)$ holds and the organism has property P_1.

A first criterion for context-dependent functional reduction is that for each theory T in $\mathcal{T}_I$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$ at least one instantiation of it within T exists:

$\forall T \in \mathcal{T}_I\, \forall S \in \mathcal{C}_T\, \exists P_1, \ldots, P_k\;\; T \cup S \vdash C(P_1, \ldots, P_k)$.

The second criterion for context-dependent functional reduction, concerning laws or regularities L is

$T_2 \vdash L(a_1, \ldots, a_k)$

$\Rightarrow\; \forall T \in \mathcal{T}_I\, \forall S \in \mathcal{C}_T\, \forall P_1, \ldots, P_k$

$[\, T \cup S \vdash C(P_1, \ldots, P_k) \;\Rightarrow\; T \cup S \vdash L(P_1, \ldots, P_k)\,]$

In general this notion of context-dependent functional reduction may still allow multiple realisation within one theory and context. However, by choosing contexts with an appropriate grain-size it can be achieved that within one given theory and context unique realisation occurs. This can be done by imposing the following additional criterion expressing that for each T in $\mathcal{T}_I$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$ there exists a unique set of instantiations (parameterised by T and S) realising the joint causal role specification $C(P_1, \ldots, P_k)$:

$\forall T \in \mathcal{T}_I\, \forall S \in \mathcal{C}_T\;\; \exists P_1, \ldots, P_k$

$[\, T \cup S \vdash C(P_1, \ldots, P_k)\;\; \&$

$\forall Q_1, \ldots, Q_k\; [\;T \cup S \vdash C(Q_1, \ldots, Q_k)$

$\Rightarrow\; T \cup S \vdash\; P_1 \leftrightarrow Q_1\; \& \ldots \&\; P_k \leftrightarrow Q_k\,]\,]$

This *unique realisation criterion* guarantees that for all systems with theory T and context S any basic state property in T_2 has a unique realiser, parameterised by theory T in $\mathcal{T}_I$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$. When also this third criterion is satisfied, a form of reduction is obtained that we call *strict context-dependent functional reduction*. Based on the unique realisation criterion, the universally quantified form for relations between laws is equivalent to the following existentially quantified variant:

$T_2 \vdash L(a_1, \ldots, a_k) \;\Rightarrow$

$\forall T \in \mathcal{T}_I\, \forall S \in \mathcal{C}_T\;\; \exists P_1, \ldots, P_k$

$[T \cup S \vdash C(P_1, \ldots, P_k)\; \&\; T \cup S \vdash L(P_1, \ldots, P_k)\,]$

Context-dependent interpretation mappings

To obtain a form of context-dependent interpretation, the notion of interpretation mapping can be generalised to a multi-mapping, parameterised by contexts. A *context-dependent interpretation* of a theory T_2 in a collection of theories $\mathcal{T}_I$ with sets of contexts $\mathcal{C}_T$ specifies for each theory T in $\mathcal{T}_I$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$ an appropriate mapping $\varphi_{T,S}$ from the expressions of T_2 to expressions of T. When both the higher and lower level theories are specified using a sorted predicate language, then such a multi-mapping can be defined on the basis of mappings of each predicate symbol from the language of T_2 and of its arguments – terms of the language of T_2 – to formulae in the language of T_1. Mappings of sorts, constants, variables and functions may be specified to define mappings of terms. Mappings of composite formulae in the language of T_2 are defined as follows:

$$\varphi_{T,S}(A_1 \,\&\, A_2) = \varphi_{T,S}(A_1) \,\&\, \varphi_{T,S}(A_2)$$

$$\varphi_{T,S}(\neg A) = \neg\, \varphi_{T,S}(A)$$

$$\varphi_{T,S}(\exists x.\, A) = \exists \varphi_{T,S}(x)\, \varphi_{T,S}(A)$$

Here A, A_1 and A_2 are formulae in the language of T_2. A multi-mapping $\varphi_{T,S}$ is a context-dependent interpretation mapping when it satisfies the property that if a law (or regularity) L can be derived from T_2, then for each T in $\mathcal{T}_1$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$ the corresponding $\varphi_{T,S}(L)$ can be derived from $T \cup S$:

$$T_2 \vdash L \Rightarrow \forall T \in \mathcal{T}_1\ \forall S \in \mathcal{C}_T\ \ T \cup S \vdash \varphi_{T,S}(L)$$

Note that also here within one theory T in $\mathcal{T}_1$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$ multiple realisation is still possible, expressed as the existence of two essentially different interpretation mappings $\varphi_{T,S}$ and $\varphi'_{T,S}$, i.e., such that it does not always hold that $\varphi_{T,S}(a) \leftrightarrow \varphi'_{T,S}(a)$. An additional criterion to obtain unique realisation per context is: when for a given theory T in $\mathcal{T}_1$ and context S in $\mathcal{C}_T$ two interpretation mappings $\varphi_{T,S}$ and $\varphi'_{T,S}$ are given, then for all formulae a in the language of T_2 it holds that

$$T \cup S \vdash \varphi_{T,S}(a) \leftrightarrow \varphi'_{T,S}(a)$$

When for each theory and context this additional criterion is satisfied as well, the interpretation is called a *strict context-dependent interpretation*.

4 CASE STUDY

In this section the applicability of the context-dependent reduction approaches described in Section 3 is illustrated for a case study involving adaptive functionality inspired by the conditioning processes in *Aplysia* (see Section 2).

To formalise both the lower and higher level theories the reified temporal predicate language *RTPL* [9] has been used, a many-sorted temporal predicate logic language that allows specification and reasoning about the dynamics of a system. To express state properties of a system ontologies are used. An ontology is a signature specified by a tuple $<S_1,\ldots, S_n,\ldots, C, f, P, arity>$, where S_i is a sort for $i=1,\ldots, n$, C is a finite set of constant symbols, f is a finite set of function symbols, P is a finite set of predicate symbols, arity is a mapping of function or predicate symbols to a natural number.

In *RTPL* state properties (that can be represented by formulae within the state language) are used as terms (denoting objects). The sort STATPROP contains the names of all state properties. The set of function symbols of *RTPL* includes $\wedge$, $\vee$, $\rightarrow$, $\leftrightarrow$: STATPROP x STATPROP → STATPROP; not: STATPROP → STATPROP, and $\forall$, $\exists$: SVARS x STATPROP → STATPROP, of which the counterparts in the state language are Boolean propositional connectives and quantifiers. To represent dynamics of a system sort TIME (a set of time points) and the ordering relation > : TIME x TIME are introduced in *RTPL*. To indicate that some state property holds at some time point the relation at: STATPROP x TIME is introduced. The terms of *RTPL* are constructed by induction in a standard way from variables, constants and function symbols typed with all before-mentioned sorts. The set of atomic *RTPL*-formulae is defined as:

(1) If t is a term of sort TIME, and p is a term of the sort STATPROP, then at(p, t) is an atomic *RTPL* formula.

(2) If $\tau 1$, $\tau 2$ are terms of any *RTPL* sort, then $\tau 1 = \tau 2$ is an *RTPL*-atom.

(3) If t1, t2 are terms of sort TIME, then t1 > t2 is an *RTPL*-atom.

The set of well-formed *RTPL* formulae is defined inductively in a standard way using Boolean connectives and quantifiers over variables of *RTPL* sorts. The language *RTPL* has the semantics of many-sorted predicate logic [24].

In the following a specification of the higher-level model *HM* for conditioning (as in *Aplysia*) is provided formalised in *RTPL* using the state ontology from Table 1. Time is assumed to be discrete in this example, and sort TIME contains natural numbers.

Table 1: State ontology for the higher-level model HM

Sort	Elements
STIMULUS	stim1, stim2
ACTION	contraction
DEGREE	low, medium, high
Predicate	**Description**
sensitivity: STIMULUS x ACTION x DEGREE	Describes the sensitivity degree of a stimulus-action relation
observesstimulus: STIMULUS	Describes the observation of a stimulus
performsaction: ACTION	Describes an action being performed

In the following formalization a and s are variable names.

HMP1 Action performance

For any time point, if the sensitivity of a relation s-a is high and the stimulus s is observed,

then at some later time point action a will be performed.

Formally:

∀t1:TIME [at(sensitivity(s, a, high) ∧ observesstimulus(s), t1) ⇒ ∃t2:TIME t2 > t1 & at(performsaction(a), t2)]

HMP2 Sensitivity increase

For any time points t1 and t2, such that t1+1 < t2 ≤ t1+c5+1
if stimulus stim1 is observed at t1 and the sensitivity of relation stim1-a is high and stimulus stim2 is observed at t2 and the sensitivity of relation stim2-a is v, and v' is the value-successor of v,
then at t2+2 the sensitivity of relation stim2-a will become v'.
Formally:
∀t1, t2:TIME ∀v, v':DEGREE [t1+1 < t2 ≤ t1+c5+1 &
at(observesstimulus(stim1) ∧ sensitivity(stim1, a, high), t1) &
at(observesstimulus(stim2) ∧ sensitivity(stim2, a, v) ∧
has_successor(v, v'), t2) ⇒
at(sensitivity(stim2, a, v'), t2+2)]

Both has_successor(low, medium) and has_successor(medium, high) are always TRUE.

HMP3 Unconditional persistency of the high sensitivity value

Formally:
∀t4:TIME [at(sensitivity(s, a, high), t4) ⇒
at(sensitivity(s, a, high), t4+1)]

HMP4 Conditional persistency of the sensitivity value other than high

For any time point t5,
if the sensitivity value of the relation stim2-a is v≠high and
and not stimulus stim2 was observed at time point t5-1,
and there exists time point t6 t5-1 > t6 ≥ t5 - c5 -1 such that stimulus stim1 was observed at t6
then at the next time point the sensitivity value of the relation stim2-a stays the same.
Formally:
∀t5:TIME ∀v:DEGREE [at(sensitivity(stim2, a, v) ∧ v≠high, t5) & ¬(at(observesstimulus(stim2), t5-1) &
∃t6 t5-1 > t6 ≥ t5 – c5 – 1 & at(observesstimulus(stim1), t6))
⇒ at(sensitivity(stim2, a, v), t5+1)]

A lower-level model *LM* for the same adaptive functionality is formalised below as a neurological makeup *NM* together with the general neurological activation rules *NA*. For the formalisation the ontology from Table 2 were used.

Table 2: State ontology for formalising the lower-level model LM

Sort	**Elements**
NEURON	sn1, sn2, mn
SYNAPSE	S1, S2
VALUE	natural numbers
Predicate	**Description**
stimulusconnection: STIMULUS x NEURON	Describes a connection between a stimulus and a (sensory) neuron
occurs: STIMULUS, occurs: ACTION	Describes an occurrence of a stimulus/action
activated: NEURON	Describes the activation of a neuron
connectedvia: NEURON x NEURON x SYNAPSE	Describes a connection between two neurons by a synapse
has_strength: SYNAPSE x VALUE	Describes the strength of a synapse
actionconnection: NEURON x ACTION	Describes a connection between a (preparatory) neuron and an action

LMP1 Neuron activation based on a stimulus

For any time point,
if a stimulus occurs,
then the neuron connected to this stimulus will be activated for c5 following time points. Formally:
∀t5:TIME ∀st:STIMULUS ∀y:NEURON [
at(stimulusconnection(st, y) ∧ occurs(st), t5)
⇒ ∀t2:TIME t5 < t2 ≤ t5+c5 & at(activated(y), t2)]

LMP2 Propagation of neuron activations

For any time point, if a neuron is activated, and this neuron is connected to some other neuron by a synapse with strength higher than B2,
then the other neuron will be also activated at the next time point.
Formally:
∀t1:TIME ∀x, y:NEURON ∀s:SYNAPSE ∀v:VALUE [
at(connectedvia(x, y, s) ∧ activated(x) ∧
has_strength(s, v) ∧ v > B2, t1) ⇒ at(activated(y), t1+1)]

LMP3 Increase of the synapse's strength

For any time point,
if two neurons connected by a synapse with strength v are activated
and at the previous time point both neurons were not activated,
then at the next time point the strength of the synapse will be v+d(v).
Formally:
∀t3:TIME ∀x,y:NEURON ∀s:SYNAPSE ∀v:VALUE [
at(activated(x) ∧ activated(y) ∧ connectedvia(x, y, s) ∧
has_strength(s, v), t3) &
at(not(activated(x) ∧ activated(y)), t3-1) ⇒
at(has_strength(s, v+d(v)), t3+1)]

LMP4 Conditional persistency of the strength value of a synapse

For any time point,
if the value of a synapse is v,
and not
both neurons are activated and
at the previous time point both neurons were not activated,
then the synapse's strength remains the same.
Formally:
∀t4:TIME ∀x,y:NEURON ∀s:SYNAPSE ∀v:VALUE [
at(connectedvia(x, y, s) ∧ has_strength(s, v), t4) &
¬(at(activated(x) ∧ activated(y), t4) & at(not(activated(x) ∧
activated(y)), t4-1)) ⇒ at(has_strength(s, v), t4+1)]

LMP5 Occurrence of an action

For any time point,
if a neuron is not activated
and at the previous time point the neuron was activated,
then after c4 time points the action related to the neuron will be performed.
Formally:
∀t7: TIME ∀x:NEURON [at(not(activated(x)), t7) &
at(actionconnection(x, a) ∧ activated(x), t7-1)
⇒ at(occurs(a), t7+c4)]

The neurological makeup *NM* is assumed to be stable in this example and is specified more formally as follows (inspired by *Aplysia*'s makeup shown in Fig. 1):

∀t:TIME at(stimulusconnection(stim1, SN1) ∧
stimulusconnection(stim2,SN2) ∧ connectedvia(SN,MN, S1)
∧ connectedvia(SN2, MN, S2) ∧
actionconnection(MN, contraction) ∧ has_strength(S1,v1) ∧
has_strength(S2,v2),t)

Applying the context-dependent reduction approaches

An interpretation mapping from the higher-level model *HM* to the lower-level model *LM* can be defined as follows. The variables and constants of sorts ACTION, STIMULUS, TIME, VALUE are mapped without changes.

$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(v:DEGREE) = v:VALUE, where v is a variable.

Suppose within the context of makeup *NM*, stimulus s is connected to the motoneuron MN via a path passing synapse S, then:

$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(s, a, low)) = has_strength (S, v) ∧ v < B1
$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(s, a, medium)) =
has_strength (S, v) ∧ B1 ≤ v ∧ v ≤ B2
$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(s, a, high)) = has_strength (S, v) ∧ v > B2
$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(s, a, v)) = has_strength (S, v),
where v is a variable

To avoid clashes between names of variables, every time when a new variable is introduced by a mapping, it should be given a name different from the names already used in the formula.

Note that the reduction relation depends on the context *NM*. Within context *NM* sensitivity for stimulus stim1 relates to synapse S1 and sensitivity for stimulus stim2 to synapse S2. Therefore, for example,

$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(stim1, a, high)) =
has_strength (S1, v) ∧ v > B2
$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(stim2, a, high)) =
has_strength (S2, v) ∧ v > B2.
Here v is a variable of sort VALUE.

Observation and action predicates are mapped as follows:

$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(observesstimulus(s)) = occurs(s)
$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(performsaction(a)) = occurs(a)
$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(has_successor(v, v')) = v'=v + d(v)

All other functional and predicate symbols of the language of *HM* are mapped without changes.

Based on the mapping $\varphi_{NA,NM}$ as defined for basic state properties, by compositionality the mapping of more complex relationships is made as described in Section 3, for example:

$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(∀t1:TIME [at(sensitivity(s, a, high) ∧
observesstimulus(s), t1) ⇒
∃t2:TIME t2 > t1 & at(performsaction(a), t2)])
= ∀t1:TIME [at($\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(s, a, high) ∧
observesstimulus(s), t1) ⇒
∃t2:TIME t2 > t1 & at($\varphi_{NA,NM}$(performsaction(a)), t2)]
= ∀t1:TIME [at($\varphi_{NA,NM}$(sensitivity(s, a, high)) ∧
$\varphi_{NA,NM}$(observesstimulus(s)), t1) ⇒
∃t2:TIME t2 > t1 & at($\varphi_{NA,NM}$(performsaction(a)), t2)]
= ∀t1:TIME [at(has_strength (syn, v) ∧ v > B2 ∧
occurs(s), t1) ⇒ ∃t2:TIME t2 > t1 & at(occurs(a), t2)]

Here s and a are the variable names and variable syn corresponds to s.

This and other regularities derivable from the higher-level specification *HM* can be mapped automatically as described below in Section 5 onto regularities that are derivable from *NA* ∪ *NM*, which illustrates the criterion for interpretation mapping.

In similar manners the other two context-based approaches can be applied to the case study. For example, context-dependent bridge principles for *NA* and context *NM* can be defined by (where the path from stimulus s to neuron *MN* is via synapse S):

sensitivity(s, a, low) ↔ has_strength (S, v) ∧ v < B1
sensitivity(s, a, medium) ↔ has_strength (S, v) ∧
B1 ≤ v ∧ v ≤ B2
sensitivity(s, a, high) ↔ has_strength (S, v) ∧ v > B2
observesstimulus(s) ↔ occurs(s)
performsaction(a) ↔ occurs(a)
has_successor(v, v') ↔ v'=v + d(v)
v:DEGREE ↔ v:VALUE,
where v is a variable

Context-dependent functional reduction can be applied by taking the joint causal role specification for sensitivity(stim2, a, low), sensitivity(stim2, a, medium), sensitivity(stim2, a, high) assuming that the sensitivity of relation stim1-a is high as follows:

C(P1, P2, P3) = def
[∀t1, t2:TIME [t1+1 < t2 ≤ t1+c5+1 &
at(observesstimulus(stim1), t1) & at(observesstimulus(stim2)
∧ P1, t2)
⇒ at(P2, t2+2)]] & [∀t1, t2:TIME [t1+1 < t2 ≤ t1+c5+1 &
at(observesstimulus(stim1), t1) & at(observesstimulus(stim2)
∧ P2, t2)
⇒ at(P3, t2+2)]] &
[∀t1:TIME [at(P3 ∧ observesstimulus(s), t1)
⇒ ∃t2:TIME t2 > t1 & at(performsaction(a), t2)]] &
[∀t4:TIME at(P3, t4) ⇒ at(P3, t4+1)] &
[∀t5:TIME ∀v:DEGREE [at(P1, t5) &
¬(at(observesstimulus(stim2),t5-1) & ∃t6 t5-1> t6 ≥ t5 –c5-1
at(observesstimulus(stim1), t6)) ⇒ at(P1, t5+1)]] &
[∀t5:TIME ∀v:DEGREE [at(P2, t5) &
¬(at(observesstimulus(stim2), t5-1) & ∃t6 t5-1>t6 ≥ t5–c5- 1
at(observesstimulus(stim1), t6)) ⇒ at(P2, t5+1)]]

5 IMPLEMENTATION

To perform an automated context-dependent mapping of a higher level model specification to a lower level model specification, a software tool has been implemented in Java™ based on the mapping principles described in Sections 3 and 4. As input for this tool a higher level model specification in sorted predicate logic is provided together with a set of mappings of basic elements of the ontology used for formalisation of the higher level specification. While a mapping is being performed on any higher-level formula, the tool traces possible clashes of variable names and renames new variables when needed. As a result, a specification in the lower level specification language is generated.

The context-dependent interpretation mapping should satisfy the reduction conditions described in Section 3. For the case considered, these conditions have the form: if a law (or property) L is derived from HM, then the corresponding mapping $\varphi_{NA,NM}(L)$ should be derived from $NA \cup NM$: $HM \vdash L \Rightarrow NA \cup NM \vdash \varphi_{NA,NM}(L)$. This will be applied to the properties in the specification HM.

Since both HM and $NA \cup NM$ are specified using the reified temporal predicate language, to establish if a formula can be derived from a set of formulae, the theorem prover Isabelle for many-sorted higher-order logic has been used [26]. As input for Isabelle a theory specification is provided. A simple theory specification consists of a declaration of ontologies, lemmas and theorems to prove. Sorts are introduced using the construct `datatype` (e.g., `datatype neuron = sn1| sn2| mn`). Furthermore, sorts for higher-order logics can be defined: e.g., sort STATPROP is defined for the case study as:

```
datatype statprop= stimulusconnection event neuron| activated neuron | occurs event | connectedvia neuron neuron synapse | actionconnection neuron event | has_strength synapse nat
```

Here each element of statprop refers to a state property, expressed using the state ontology. The elements of the state ontology should be also defined in the theory : e.g., `activated:: "neuron ⇒ statprop"`; `stimulusconnection:: "event ⇒ neuron ⇒ statprop"`. The formulae of the state language are imported into the reified language using the predicate `at:: "statprop ⇒ nat ⇒ bool"`.

The first theory specification defines the following lemma expressing the criterion for the mapping of the property HMP1 (Action Performance), which expresses

$$NA \cup NM \vdash \forall t1{:}TIME\ [\ at(has\_strength\ (syn, v) \wedge v > B2 \wedge occurs(s), t1) \Rightarrow \exists t2{:}TIME\ t2 > t1\ \&\ at(occurs(a), t2)\ ]$$

To enable the automated proof of this lemma the implication introduction rule [26] is applied, which moves the part $\forall t1{:}TIME\ \forall s{:}STIMULUS\ [\ at(has\_strength\ (syn, v) \wedge v > B2 \wedge occurs(s), t1)$ to the assumptions. Then, the lemma is proved automatically by the *blast* method, which is an efficient classical reasoner. Note that for the actual proof only the relevant part of $NA \cup NM$ has been used.

The second specification defines the lemma for the mapping of the property HMP2 (Sensitivity increase), which expresses

$$NA \cup NM \vdash \forall t1, t2{:}TIME\ \forall v, v'{:}VALUE\ [\ t1+1 < t2 \leq t1+c5+1\ \&\ at(occurs(stim1) \wedge has\_strength\ (S1, var) \wedge var > B2, t1)\ \&\ at(occurs(stim2) \wedge has\_strength\ (S2, v) \wedge v'=v + d(v), t2) \Rightarrow at(has\_strength\ (S2, v'), t2+2)\ ]$$

For the proof of this lemma the same strategy has been used as for the previous example. The proofs of both examples have been performed in a fraction of a second.

6 DISCUSSION

Within Cognitive Science, cognitive theories provide higher-level descriptions of the functioning of specific neural makeups. The concepts and relationships used in the descriptions do not have a direct one-to-one relationship to reality such as concepts and relationships used within physics or chemistry have. Due to the nontrivial dependence of cognitive theories on the context of specific (neural) makeups of individuals or species, relationships between cognitive states are not considered genuine universal laws; by changing the specific makeup they simply can be refuted. Therefore they cannot have a direct truth-preserving relationship to general physical/biological laws. The classical approaches to reduction such as bridge law reduction, functional reduction and interpretation mappings do not take into account this context-dependency in an explicit manner. Therefore, in this paper refinements of these classical reduction approaches are used that incorporate the context-dependency in an explicit manner. These context-dependent reduction approaches make explicit how laws or regularities in a cognitive theory depend on lower-level laws on the one hand and specific makeups on the other hand. The detailed formalised definitions of the approaches described in this paper enable practical application to higher-level and lower-level knowledge specification. Just like in the case of cognitive theories, here the context-dependent reduction approaches make explicit how concepts and relationships in higher-level specifications relate to lower-level specifications. Using these formalized relations reduction approaches can be automated. In particular, this paper illustrates how the interpretation mapping approach can be automated, including mapping of specifications and checking the fulfilment of reduction criteria. In the example considered the mapping of basic ontological elements was assumed to be given. In the future research approaches to identify basic ontological mappings will be developed.

Knowledge modelling can be considered as a design process. Within design, a central role is played by artefact descriptions, which describe the functioning of the artefact (being) designed (cf. [10, 17]). During a design process, different types of descriptions can be used to refer to an artefact and its properties. Such specifications may concern, for example, requirements specifications versus a design description, or a functional description versus a description of the artefact's structure, behaviour, or its realisation. Within such descriptions, also relationships between concepts involved are considered. Concepts and relationships in such design artefact descriptions have a status similar to the chameleon-like status of cognitive concepts and laws. In this respect knowledge modelling, and more generally design and engineering science, and Cognitive Science resemble each other as special sciences, and it may be fruitful to consider solutions developed for cognitive science also as possibilities for clarification and foundation of issues within knowledge modelling, and design and engineering sciences more in general. This holds also for the areas addressing the design of software systems, such as requirements engineering and software engineering.

Within software and knowledge engineering a variety of specification environments and platforms has been developed, among others based on different hardware and operating systems. Higher-level specification languages play a unifying role over these various environments and platforms; their descriptions are multi-realisable within them. Each platform and specification environment defines a different context.

In conclusion, this paper proposes and elaborates three context-dependent reduction approaches that allow relating (automatically) knowledge specifications of different conceptual levels by example of relations of a cognitive theory specification to a specification within physical or biological contexts. Furthermore, the approaches as developed for cognitive science offer a useful philosophical foundation for knowledge modelling, and design and engineering sciences.

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